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Postmodernism presents most American conservative evangelical churches 
with the following challenge and dilemma: If  the modernism that was pervasive 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries served as the philosophical and 
epistemological basis for the formulation and expression of  the doctrinal 
statements and frameworks of  most modern American denominations, 
what happens to those doctrinal frameworks when postmodernism reveals 
the flaws and fallacies of  that modernistic foundation? If  those doctrinal 
frameworks can be salvaged, it can only be, postmoderns would argue, by a 
significant reworking of  them in light of  the postmodern critique. How are 
modern, biblically conservative evangelicals to respond to this challenge?
In good postmodern tradition, we will begin with a narrative. The 
current state of  engagement of  conservative evangelical thought with 
postmodernism can be illustrated by the story of  a recent church conference 
on postmodernism and the mission of  the church. The conference was held 
at Andrews University in October of  2012.2 Andrews is operated by the 
Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose particular doctrinal formulations, like 
many American denominations, have their roots in the religious revivals of  
the Second Great Awakening of  the early nineteenth century.  
Thus, the Andrews conference provides an insight into how broader 
conservative evangelicalism is grappling with these issues, especially as it 
was attended by evangelical participants and presenters from a variety of  
faith traditions. Three major points emerged from the conference that can 
help guide the church in its future engagements with postmodernism and 
secularism. The first two points received a general consensus of  support, but 
the third point was contested. It is the disagreement on the third point that 
provides this article with its focus.
The first point of  agreement was that postmodernism is at least two 
things; the first being an intellectual, ideological approach to reality, often 
associated most strongly with certain French post-structural intellectuals 
after World War II, who critiqued the universalist and absolutist claims of  
1Nicholas Miller is a professor of  Church History at the Seventh-day Adventist 
Theological Seminary at Andrews University. He dedicates this paper to Dr. Michael 
Pearson, professor at Newbold College in England, from whom he took his first 
course in philosophy, which began to open up to him the world of  God’s other book.
2A description of  the conference, the speakers, the papers, and links to audio files 
of  the presentations can be found at https://revisitingpostmodernism.wordpress.
com/.
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modernity associated with the Enlightenment project of  seeking for universal 
and objective truths.   
The other thing that postmodernism consists of  is a cultural mood, 
or attitude, that harbors skepticism to all forms of  authority, privileges the 
individual’s subjective experiences, and opposes any claim to universal truths 
or a “meta-narrative” that embraces humanity.  
It was acknowledged that many people who have never heard of  post-
structuralism, Foucault, or Derrida, nevertheless live with a postmodern 
attitude or perspective. Indeed, this would seem to be the prevailing cultural 
sense in most centers of  education and urbanism in the West, and increasingly 
in other countries around the world.  
The second point of  commonality at the conference was that whatever 
the merits or demerits of  postmodernism are as an ideology—and most 
presenters were quite critical of  it—the existence of  the cultural form of  
postmodernism requires a response and recognition from Adventist missions. 
As the keynote speaker, Dr. John Stackhouse, put it, like any culture we 
try to reach, postmodernism has its good points and bad points; but for the 
missionary, the most important point is that it is—and if  we want to reach 
people impacted by it, we must learn to communicate with their concerns, 
sensitivities, and values in mind. The manner and style with which the biblical 
message is delivered needs to be revised to make it more relational, modest, 
and dialogical, at least when targeting postmodern populations. 
The third, and more contested, point of  the conference was the question 
of  how the church in its mission should respond to the intellectual, substantive 
claims and critique of  postmodernism. There was at least partial agreement 
on this point. Most participants seemed to accept that postmodernism was 
relatively accurate in its critique of  the excesses of  modernity, with its claims 
to objectivity, absolutism, and universality.  
The main point of  contention came in relation to how the church 
should connect its own theology and beliefs to the claims of  the postmodern. 
There were a minority of  voices that seemed to be calling for a recasting of  
Adventist theology and biblical study in light of  the claims of  postmodernity. 
These voices argued that Adventist theology was developed in the context of  
principles of  modernism, and that it thus suffers from the same excesses and 
absolutism of  the modern project. Thus, they reasoned, not only the style and 
approach of  message delivery needs adjusting, but the message itself  needs 
modification in light of  postmodern insights.
The majority of  speakers, though, appeared to reject this approach. 
As one speaker put it, we need to have churches that are sensitive to the 
postmodern seeker, but the churches themselves, and the content of  their 
messages, should not become postmodern. Most of  the plenary speakers were 
clear on the point that the Christian gospel does contain a meta-narrative, 
and that this should not and cannot be denied. The question is how best to 
communicate it to the postmodern skeptic.
Still, the majority of  speakers did not seem to have a clear response to 
the question raised as to what paradigm alternate to either postmodernism 
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or modernism the church’s message could be framed in. Indeed, one of  the 
main speakers suggested that a number of  scholars believe that the Adventist 
approach to Scripture has been rooted in the Enlightenment suppositions 
undergirding modernism, thus making it vulnerable to the postmodern 
critique.3 
If  all agreed that postmodernism did make an effective critique 
of  modernism, yet most were unwilling to base Adventist theology on 
postmodernism, where did that leave the church? This question was raised, 
and there was no clear response. One was left with the sense that we should 
retreat to some kind of  chastened, less aggressive modernism. But no principle 
was provided that would help distinguish this “humble” modernism from 
the modernism associated with colonial excesses and wars of  the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. The message to do modernism better, with more 
restraint, does not provide enough detail on which to build a system of  belief  
or theology.
This article proposes to help answer the question of  what framework 
of  knowledge can be used by Adventists, as well as other conservative 
evangelicals, to construct their message that avoids the modern/postmodern 
conundrum. It draws on the history of  a philosophical movement that 
developed in parallel with the foundationalism typically associated with 
Western modernism.  
It was a framework that reached a zenith in later colonial and early 
republican America; was part of  the undergirding of  the religious thought 
of  the Second Great Awakening of  the early nineteenth century; provided 
the philosophical framework for the many revival and restorationist groups 
coming out of  that Awakening, including the Adventist church; and then 
faded from American Protestant thought in the late nineteenth century, and 
from Adventism in the early part of  the twentieth century.4  
One could call this framework a version of  modernism, as it did have 
Enlightenment influences. But it also had more conventionally religious 
roots and was really an amalgamation, or coproduction, of  certain strands of  
Enlightenment and religious, typically dissenting Protestant, thought.5 It did 
3D. J. B. Trim, “Watchmen over the flux of  thought: Foucault, Barthes, Derrida, 
and the historical development of  postmodernist philosophy” (paper, presented at 
the conference “Revisiting Postmodernism: An Old Debate on a New Era,” Andrews 
University, October 18-20, 2012), 20.
4This framework has been discussed in overview and general detail in a number 
of  works, such as Mark Noll, American’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 93-113; Henry F. May, The Enlightenment 
in America (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), 307-362; Sydney E. Ahlstrom, “The 
Scottish Philosophy and American Theology,” Church History 24.3 (Sep., 1955): 257-
272. These works sketch the general rise and influence of  Scottish Common Sense 
philosophy, though they leave generally unexplored the varying strands of  how that 
thought contributed to both foundationalist and nonfoundationalist epistemologies.  
5Ahlstrom recognized the varied religious roots of  the movement, including 
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not represent a complete break with the premodern era, but a modification 
and continuation, and it itself  had multiple facets, not all of  which were 
accepted by those groups influenced by it.6 
But it was distinctly different from twentieth-century modernism so as 
to not, in my opinion, be susceptible to the main thrust of  the postmodern 
critique. Now, the important practical point here is that if  much of  late-
eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century evangelical theology, including 
Adventism, was constructed on this other, alternate system of  early modern 
thought, then it does not need to radically or even significantly reconstruct 
or restructure its belief  system to take into account the postmodern critique. 
Admittedly, there will still need to be some modifications. Certainly, 
evangelical and Adventist doctrine in the twentieth century has been 
influenced and even shaped to some degree by the foundationalisms of  both 
the liberal and fundamentalist strands of  Christianity. But while this streak of  
both liberal and fundamentalist modernism exists in Adventism, it is largely an 
accretion of  the early-to-mid-twentieth century. Adventism’s underpinnings 
rest, in my opinion, on a different set of  philosophical assumptions.  
I. Liberalism and Fundamentalism: Twin Products of  
Philosophical Foundationalism
Nancey Murphy, in her book Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism: How Modern 
and Post-Modern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda, reveals the irony that the 
apparently warring twentieth-century religious ideologies of  theological 
liberalism and fundamentalism are both based on the same, nonscriptural 
epistemological basis of  Cartesian foundationalism.7
Murphy argues that, in essence, the Cartesian ideal is that all knowledge 
we commit to must be based on “indubitable foundation.” It posits knowledge 
bases that are immune from challenge, absolutely certain, and from which we 
can build our system of  beliefs. The fundamentalists found this absolute basis 
of  certainty externally in an inerrant, verbally inspired Bible that they believed 
could meet this standard of  certainty. The liberals found their certainty 
internally, in the individual’s religious experiences and feelings. Murphy argues 
Thomas Aquinas, Richard Hooker, and John Locke, in “whose shadow the entire 
movement flourished.” Ahlstrom, 259.
6Mark Noll distinguishes epistemological, ethical, and methodological strands 
within the Common Sense Tradition, with various strands being accepted, emphasized, 
or rejected by various groups at different times in American history. These distinctions 
become important below as we explore how different groups impacted by Common 
Sense moved either away or toward a philosophically foundationalist outlook. Mark 
A. Noll, “Common Sense Traditions and American Evangelical Thought,” American 
Quarterly 37, 2 (Summer 1985): 220-223.
7Nancy Murphy, Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern 
Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996), 
11-35.
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that both the fundamentalist and liberal systems end up misusing the Bible 
because of  their adherence to this problematic philosophical system. 
Murphy’s framework has helped guide my telling of  the story in my 
church history courses of  the rise of  modern philosophy and its connection 
to conservative and liberal Christianity. But in telling this story of  Christianity’s 
twentieth-century bifurcation, I believe that Murphy’s narrative would be 
helped by a small modification, an enrichment at least, in the telling of  its 
historical roots. This nuancing of  the story opens up space to understand a 
version of  Protestant philosophy that was not quite the same, in my opinion, 
as the modern foundationalism effectively critiqued by postmodernism.  
Murphy includes in her book a simple yet helpful chart that gives a quick 
historical overview of  the development of  foundationalism and its relation to 
modern Christianity. It looks like this:
               Reid   Princeton Theology   Fundamentalism
           
   
Descartes  Locke  Hume
                 
               Kant    Schleiermacher    Liberalism
This chart is very helpful in understanding the common foundationalist 
roots to the otherwise competing systems of  theological fundamentalism and 
liberalism. But my study of  these thinkers has led me to believe that this 
story can be helpfully complicated a bit, by recognizing a major difference 
between some of  these thinkers over the role that “certainty” plays in reliable 
knowledge.  
II.  John Locke, Probabilism and Judgment
In my work on religious liberty, I spent quite a bit of  time dealing with John 
Locke and his works on knowledge and epistemology.8 While elements of  
Locke seem somewhat modern and even foundationalist, he actually differs 
quite a bit from Descartes and Hume in not emphasizing “the universal, the 
timeless, the theoretical,” as Murphy describes the foundationalists. Rather, 
he is much more concerned with the “particular, the timely, the practical,” as 
Murphy characterizes nonfoundational, premodern thought.9  
8Nicholas Miller, The Religious Roots of  the First Amendment (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012).
9Murphy, Beyond Liberalism, 13.
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There is one more word that characterized Locke’s thought—
“probability,” which stands in contrast to certainty. As Locke himself  put 
it, “Probability, rather than knowledge, must be our guide in most of  the 
affairs of  life. . . . ‘Our business here is not to know all things, but those 
which concern our conduct.’ Therefore it is practical knowledge which is the 
truly valuable part of  knowledge.”10 In Locke’s view, the objective is not to 
achieve absolute certainty, but to understand the side on which the balance of  
evidence lies, and to act accordingly.
This is a very different mode and mindset from that of  Descartes. It is 
not just the rationalist/empiricist divide that separated Locke from Descartes. 
In addition, Locke also differed with Descartes over that central element 
of  foundationalism, at least as Murphy and others describe it, the need for 
indubitable foundations, or absolute certainty.  
These observations about Locke’s non-Cartesian bent toward practicality 
and probability were underscored by Locke scholar Douglas Casson in his 
recent book Liberating Judgment: Fanatics, Skeptics, and John Locke’s Politics of  
Probability.11 Casson portrays Locke as blazing a middle pathway between the 
“skepticism of  Montaigne and the foundationalism of  Descartes.”  
Both these systems were the opposite sides of  the same coin, somewhat 
like the fundamentalism and liberalism of  our day; they were both based 
on a desire for certainty and led to a “political quietism.” Both deferred to 
traditional authorities, one in the name of  the authority of  tradition, the other 
on a belief  in a centralized moral certainty.12
While the young Locke was something of  a traditionalist and absolutist, 
the more mature Locke avoided both of  these extremes by his foray into 
notions of  probability, judgment, and reasonableness.13 Locke believed that 
most belief  was that of  probability, rather than absolute knowledge. The 
areas of  probability included scientific, moral, and religious beliefs, to which 
he gave a similar status of  probability and reliability. (Ironically, the field of  
actual knowledge, while very small, included religious beliefs such as the 
existence of  God and His right to receive worship.)   
Locke’s critical move was to recognize the role of  internal judgment in 
coming to an understanding and acceptance of  truth. This role of  probability, 
giving importance to the internal reflections and judgments of  each person, is 
what sets Locke’s philosophy quite distinctly apart from Descartes and what I 
would call the absolute foundationalists.  
It was this internal role and deliberation necessary to making judgments 
about knowledge, I believe, that caused Locke to value freedom of  thought 
and religion as he did. But it also puts him in a different path and trajectory 
than that of  foundationalism as set out by Murphy. Instead, Casson puts 
Locke in a different genealogy, one going back through a series of  Protestant 
10John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I.I.6.
11(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
12Ibid., 21-22.
13Miller, Religious Roots, 64-67.
43Alongside FoundAtionAlism
thinkers who emphasized notions of  the importance of  personal, internal 
judgment, and even experience in matters of  religion.  
I have previously written about Locke’s encounter with the thought of  
dissenting Protestant thinkers who emphasized the internal role of  the Holy 
Spirit in prompting people to come to religious judgments and decisions. 
These included Baptists, Quakers, and other Protestant dissenters. While 
direct cause cannot be proven, it is very interesting that it was during and 
after being exposed to these ideas of  religious judgment that he developed 
a philosophical version that was very similar to these religious approaches.14   
Casson also sees religious precursors to Locke’s thought on probability 
and judgment. These included the thinkers of  the Great Circle of  Tew, of  
which William Chillingworth was a member. Chillingworth was the author 
of  The Religion of  the Protestants, a work that emphasized the role of  private 
judgment and practical reason in arriving at scriptural truths. Another 
precursor was Hugo Grotius, the Arminian remonstrant who authored the 
first modern Christian apologetic, The Truth of  the Christian Religion. In it, he 
appealed to the “nondemonstrable facts of  history” whereby persons might 
show the “moral certainty” or “probability” of  religious truth.15 
After Locke we have the continuation of  the school of  probability 
or practical certainty in the work of  Scottish clergyman and philosopher 
Thomas Reid. Reid was the most notable force behind the school of  Scottish 
Common Sense philosophy; a system that made claims about epistemology, 
reason, and ethics grounded in common human experience.16  
Reid’s view of  the practicality of  knowledge is captured in the title of  
“common sense” that is attached to his philosophy. The phrase did not mean 
that all things widely or commonly believed are true. Rather, it is the view that 
certain truths about humans and reality must be true for rational discourse to 
take place at all. Thus these truths must be “common” to all.  
These essential truths would include the idea that our perceptions of  
material things are reasonably reliable, that words convey some kind of  
meaning, that other rational minds do exist. Without assuming these things, 
no attempt at rational discourse is possible. Since even those that deny these 
things, or say that they cannot be proved, use words and discourse to do so, 
even they assume them to be true. Thus, our senses of  these foundational 
truths are common and shared.17 
14Miller, Religious Roots, 67-72.
15Ibid., 113.
16Some important recent works about Reid and his contributions to Scottish 
Common Sense philosophy include, Terence Cuneo, René van Woudenberg, eds., The 
Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); 
John Haldane, Stephen L. Read, eds., The Philosophy of  Thomas Reid: A Collection of  
Essays (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid 
and the Story of  Epistemology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
17Ronald E. Beanblossom, ed., Thomas Reid: Inquiry and Essays (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1983), xliv-xlvi.
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The practical concerns of  his system caused him to accept as valuable 
knowledge that which was less than absolutely certain and fully demonstrable. 
As one Reid scholar put it, “Reid rejects the claim that we can only be said 
to know for certain in those cases where it is logically impossible to be 
mistaken; it is not the case that the only demonstrative knowledge constitutes 
knowledge.”18 Another framed it thus: “Epistemologically, it would appear 
that we know things only on a common sense level with a type of  practical 
certainty, rather than any ‘absolute’ certainty.”19
Reid himself  wrote that “philosophers consider probable evidence, not 
as a degree, but as a species of  evidence, which is opposed, not to certainty, 
but to another species of  evidence, called demonstration.” Reid is particularly 
concerned to reject Hume’s argument that all knowledge is merely probability, 
and therefore not true knowledge.20 For these reasons, one Reid scholar has 
described Reid as “Locke purged and Locke re-created. It is only a mild 
exaggeration to say that Reid’s system is a critical reconstruction of  Locke.”21
III. Modern Probabilism and Scottish Common Sense: 
An Alternative to Hard Foundationalism
Based on these observations about Locke and the stream of  probabilism he 
inherits and transmits, I would propose an alternate or parallel genealogy to that 
sketched by Murphy. It is one of  a modern probabilism that runs parallel with 
modern foundationalism. This probabilism22 differs from foundationalism 
in both holding to a different standard of  reliability, probability rather than 
certainty; and also in its willingness to base truths on multiple sources, such 
as reason, experience, and nature as well as Scripture.
18Ibid., xliv.
19Elmer H. Duncan, ed., Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology (1780) 
(Washington, DC: University Press of  America, 1981), xxxxv.
20Ibid., xiv.
21G. A. Johnson, “Introduction,” Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of  Common 
Sense (Chicago: Open Court, 1915), 15.
22Some may call it a “soft foundationalism,” but that would be to mischaracterize 
it. Not only does it differ from traditional foundationalism in its acceptance of  
probability rather than certainty, but it also allows for multiple sources and resources 
for truth, versus the one source allowed for by foundationalism, whether it be 
empiricism, rationalism, or Scripture and revelation.
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I would re-draw this historical genealogy to look something like this:
                     Romanticism/Idealism/Dualism
                     Schleiermacher        Liberalism
Foundationalism     
Descartes       Hume        Kant    
                     Empiricism/Positivism/Deism
                     Priestly        Jefferson        Unitarianism  
  
    Propositional Certainty 
                     Later “Princeton Theology”        Fundamentalism
Probabilism             
Grotius        Locke        Reid       Early “Princeton Theology”
                     Evidentiary Experientialism  
                     New School Presb.         Finney/Barnes
This new chart more accurately reflects that John Locke and Scottish 
philosopher Thomas Reid were really in significant opposition to many of  
the central ideas of  Hume and Kant, most especially the latter’s need for 
certainty and corresponding denial that moral or value truths could come 
from examining the natural world. This chart would work better in three 
dimensions, with the ends curved in a circle to show the empiricism of  
Priestly and Jefferson approaching near the propositional certainty of  the later 
Princeton school; and the evidentiary experientialists of  the New Schoolers 
abutting the Romantic idealism of  Schleiermacher and the liberals.  
As Thomas Reid’s Common Sense philosophy developed in America, its 
epistemological strand stayed vital among many and varied religious groups, 
but its ethical, natural moral philosophy side was in good part rejected by those 
that developed the nineteenth-century Princeton theology. This rejection of  
natural sources of  truth led to a kind of  foundationalism, as the Princeton 
school embraced a single-source of  absolute truth—the verbally-inspired, 
inerrant Scriptures. This move pushed them towards the foundationalism of  
the Deists and Unitarians, but with a different foundation, that of  Scripture, 
rather than reason applied to the natural world.
The continued use of  ethical Common Sense by the New Haven 
theologians and New School Presbyterians caused them to continue to value 
both natural morality and sense experience as a bridge to and supplement for 
Scripture. This combination, which I term evidential experientialism, caused 
this group to have greater communality with the romantics and idealists. This 
similarity caused some to see the New School as the forerunners of  modern 
liberal theology. While there may be some overlap between the two groups, 
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for the most part the New School thinkers continued to embrace natural 
morality and the truth of  Scriptural propositions in a manner very different 
from that found in idealism, the main source of  theological liberalism.
 Thus, the top of  the chart and the bottom are actually closer to each 
other than those in the middle, which a three-dimensional chart could show. 
Further, in putting Locke and Reid in the same row, one must acknowledge 
that they had some significant differences with each other, especially on the 
question of  ideas in the role of  knowledge. But on the point of  probability as 
sufficient for knowledge and beliefs, and on the belief  in multiple sources of  
truth, they were in agreement.  
IV. Ethical Scottish Common Sense, Natural Law, and Intuition
An important point that characterizes Scottish common-sense philosophy for 
Christian theology and thinkers is the validity of  knowledge attainable from 
God’s second book of  nature. Apart from his works on the philosophy of  
knowledge and epistemology, Thomas Reid also lectured on the importance 
of  natural theology, or truths about God, morality, and humanity discoverable 
from observations of  the natural world.23
This view of  multiple sources of  truth, with one source often confirming 
or supporting another (intuition, supporting reason, overlapping in places with 
Scripture) also distinguishes this common sense, probabilistic philosophical 
approach from Cartesian foundationalism.24    
That “absolute certainty” could not be achieved through these 
probabilistic methods, either for law or ethics, did not prevent their use for 
both. Unlike either Humean skepticism, or Kantian dualism, the Scottish 
thinkers continued to posit a connection between the natural world and moral 
or ethical beliefs and ideas. It is not a coincidence that the eighteenth-century 
Scottish enlightenment produced some of  the primary Protestant works on 
natural law and natural morality, including those of  Thomas Reid, Francis 
Hutchinson, Lord Kames, and Adam Smith.25  
23Elmer H. Duncan, Ed., Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology (1780) 
(Washington, DC: University Press of  America, 1981).
24An analogy to Scottish common sense ideas in the world of  theology would 
be the Weslyan quadrilateral, where four sources of  authority, scripture, reason, 
experience, and tradition, mutually support and verify each other in a series of  
overlapping encounters. The fact that Scripture is the senior partner in the enterprise 
(prima scriptura) and the sole basis of  Christian doctrine (sola scriptura), cannot 
obscure the underlying truth that this system is based on an epistemology that shows 
a belief  in multiple sources of  truth, in which each source needs the support and 
affirmation of  other sources to be viewed as reliable or verified. Whidden, Woodrow 
W., “Sola Scriptura, Inerrantist Fundamentalism, and The Wesleyan Quadrilateral: Is 
‘No Creed but The Bible: A Workable Solution?’”Andrews University Seminary Studies 35, 
no. 2 (Autumn 1997), 211-226.
25Thomas Ahnert, The Moral Culture of  the Scottish Enlightenment 1690-1805 (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 1-3, 87.
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The natural law and rights ideas of  Jefferson and Madison in colonial 
America reflect both Lockean and Scottish Enlightenment views of  
the meaningfulness of  the natural law, of  natural rights, which is a kind 
of  morality, that can be derived from that law. But the ideas of  Reid and 
Hutchinson found probably their most influential advocate in America in the 
form of  John Witherspoon, Scottish Presbyterian pastor turned president of  
the College of  New Jersey, the forerunner of  Princeton.26
Witherspoon served at early Princeton from 1768-1794, firmly 
establishing the school in the Scottish enlightenment views of  epistemology 
and natural philosophy. He accomplished this in good part by personally 
teaching the capstone course, entitled simply “Moral Philosophy,” that all 
students took in their senior year. In this course, Witherspoon set out a view 
of  morality and ethics that could be understood and supported from reason. 
As he put it, the class was called moral “philosophy, because it is an enquiry 
into the nature and grounds of  moral obligation by reason, as distinct from 
revelation.”27  
Witherspoon’s commitment to a reasoned morality did not “arise from 
a rejection or disfavor of  special revelation.” To the contrary, Witherspoon 
taught that “the discoveries of  reason cannot be contrary to the Bible and that 
there is nothing certain or valuable in moral philosophy, but what is perfectly 
coincident with the scripture.”28 But moral philosophy was a vital addition to 
Scripture, because it provided the framework, the web, which could connect 
all the disciplines outside divinity, whether it be political science, or history, or 
the natural sciences, to the larger world of  moral concepts.
This common-sense-based moral philosophy became the working 
undercarriage of  the Protestant educational enterprise in late-eighteenth, 
and early- to mid-nineteenth-century America. It was characterized by three 
things, two of  which we have already discussed. The first was what we might 
call the probabilistic, wholistic nature of  reliable knowledge. This view denied 
that an objective, absolute certainty on most matters relating to life and faith 
was practical or even possible. Rather, it argued for a reliability, a practical 
assurance, supported by certain evidences, but which also was supported by 
our reason, experience, as well as moral and common sense.
The second characteristic flowed from the first, and was what we might 
call the wholistic nature of  reality. This was shown in the reliabilist’s willingness 
to accept and consider truth claims from a variety of  sources, including 
26A discussion of  Witherspoon’s impressive career in outline and his influence 
on Princeton and America can be found in Jeffrey H. Morrison, John Witherspoon and 
the Founding of  the American Republic (Notre Dame, IN: University of  Notre Dame 
Press, 2005); George Eugene Rich, John Witherspoon: His Scottish Intellectual Background 
(Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1964); L. H. Butterfield, John Witherspoon Comes to 
America: A Documentary Account Based Largely on New Materials (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1953).
27Mark A. Noll, Princeton and the Republic: 1768-1822 (Vancouver, BC: Regent 
College Publishing, 2004), 45.
28Ibid., 45.
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Scripture, reason, experience, moral sense, etc. This made the possibility of  
both moral philosophy and natural law possible for a people who otherwise 
had a very high regard for Scripture, and might be willing to make Scripture 
the only source for spiritual and moral truths. They understood that God had 
a second book, nature, which included the world, as well as human nature and 
experience, through which moral principles could also be discerned.
These first two points led to a third point, which eventually split the 
early Protestant Common Sense consensus in the United States, and led in 
part, in my view, to the development of  fundamentalism. This third point 
was a doctrinal point that flowed from the first two points. If  God could 
communicate reliable truths through multiple sources, then one could use 
these sources to understand claims made by the Bible about God. If  the Bible 
said that God was just, and moral, then He could be understood to be just 
and moral by standards of  morality and justice accessible by human reason 
generally.  
This conception that human reason in reflecting on nature could discern 
basic moral truths, if  only in crude outline, allowed for the development of  a 
theological view or system called the moral government of  God. This system 
was rooted in the free-will theology of  Jacob Arminius, and was developed 
by one of  his disciples, the legal great and Christian apologist, Hugo Grotius. 
It built on Arminius’ desire to invoke human freedom, not in order to build 
up human prestige or autonomy, but to defend God’s honor and character 
in not being the author of  evil. Free will became the firewall, as it were, that 
prevented God from being tagged, or vilified, as the cause and originator of  
evil.29
Grotius built on this insight to talk about a moral government of  God, 
which needed to preserve God’s reputation for justice, which was the basis 
of  the long-term stability of  his government, while also allowing him to 
be merciful in forgiving sinners. He developed a theory of  the atonement, 
whereby God is not concerned about his personal honor or prestige, but 
rather about the integrity of  the government that He oversees. It is God in 
His role as ruler of  the universe that must provide a consistent oversight to 
His system of  laws upon which the universe depends.30
The Moral Government of  God was an attractive model for those 
influenced by Arminius, and early supporters of  it included John Milton, 
John Wesley, and Thomas Reid himself. Milton, as a young man, had met 
and stayed with Grotius briefly in Paris, and admired his works. His Paradise 
Lost, of  course, was written with the specific purpose to “Justify the ways 
29Roger E. Olson, The Story of  Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of  Tradition & 
Reform (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 467.
30Hugo Grotius, A Defence of  the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of  Christ 
against Faustus Socinus, trans. and introduction, Frank Hugh Foster (Andover, MA: 
Warren F. Draper, 1889).
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of  God to men,” a theme that assumes that God operates a just, fair, moral 
government.31 
Samuel Wesley, John Wesley’s father, viewed Hugo Grotius as his favorite 
biblical commentator, and he recommended him to John. The writings of  
Grotius came to be a great theological resource for Wesley and his “Methodist” 
friends at Oxford University.32 Methodism, which had a free will bent, and 
which was influenced by the thought of  Arminius and Grotius, continued to 
develop its theology of  God’s justice, atonement, and restoration around the 
Moral Government of  God model.33
Despite coming from a Calvinist, reformed background, Thomas Reid’s 
Moral Government framework assumed that humans were moral, accountable 
beings who possessed capacity for voluntary behavior and free will. It was 
these voluntary, human wills that, for Reid, shielded God from accusations of  
being the originator of  evil.34
Reid specifically developed arguments about the Moral Government of  
God in his lectures on natural theology.35 For Reid, a moral nature was central 
to God’s being, and this expressed itself  in “the Moral Government of  
God.”36 “In His Moral Government,” Reid wrote, “he acts like a Legislator, 
who proposes rules of  conduct to his subjects and as they obey or disobey 
them so may they expect his favor or displeasure.”37  
The reformed tradition, Reid notwithstanding, tended to be resistant to 
Moral Government claims, as they believed that it inappropriately elevated 
human will and reason. But under the influence of  Scottish Common 
Sense philosophy and Reid, the Moral Government of  God idea began to 
be adopted by some prominent Calvinist thinkers in late eighteenth-century 
America. The logic of  the movement caused these reformed thinkers to begin 
to modify notions of  human choice and free will in regards to salvation.  
The movement within American Calvinism began to coalesce in certain 
reformed thinkers through the efforts of  successors to Jonathan Edwards, 
such as Joseph Bellamy and Jonathan Edwards, Jr. It was given its most 
31Anniina Jokinen, “Life of  John Milton,” Luminarium, June 21, 2006, Accessed 
on February 27, 2015, http://www.luminarium.org/sevenlit/milton/miltonbio.htm.
32Richard P. Heitzenrater, ed., Diary of  an Oxford Methodist: Benjamin Ingham, 1733-
34 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985).
33Wesley was a strong supporter of  the natural theology or religion espoused by 
Bishop Butler in his famed Analogy of  Religion: Natural and Revealed, a work that Thomas 
Reid also endorsed. Elton M. Hendricks, “John Wesley and Natural Theology,” Weslyian 
Theological Journal, 18, no. 2 (Fall 1983): 12-13; American Methodist theologian Richard 
Watson continued to develop the Moral Government of  God theme in his Theological 
Institutes; or a View of  the Evidences, Doctrines, Morals, and Institutions of  Christianity (New 
York: J. Emory and B. Waugh, 1831), 254 (emphasis added).
34Ibid., 101-102.
35Duncan, Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology, 72-73, 94-95, 117-120.
36Ibid., 72, 82-84, 117.
37Ibid., 117.
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formal and extended expression, however, through the theological teachings 
and writings of  Nathaniel Taylor, a Yale Professor of  Divinity in the early 
nineteenth century.38  
Taylor, a member of  the Congregationalist church, modified Calvinist 
views of  human will and the atonement to allow for Christ’s sacrifice to make 
provision for all, and for all humans to have the possibility to choose it. His 
great theme, and the title of  his collected lectures, was The Moral Government 
of  God.39  
While Taylor is not a common name today, he had influence beyond 
Congregationalism, and impacted a sufficient number of  Presbyterians to give 
rise to what has been termed New School Presbyterianism. Another leading 
figure associated with this movement was Charles Finney, the lawyer turned 
evangelist. Finney spearheaded much of  the revivalism of  the later part of  
the Second Great Awakening, and helped found Oberlin College.40 Another 
expositor of  views like Taylor’s was the widely popular Biblical commentator 
Albert Barnes, whose Biblical commentaries sold a million copies by the 
1870s.41  
The revivalism of  the Second Great Awakening, and the modification 
of  Calvinism away from strict determinism and a limited atonement, caused 
a pushback from various Calvinist theologians against a philosophy that they 
felt gave too much room for the role of  human reason and moral sentiment. 
A number of  these scholars were based at Princeton.  
Historian Mark Noll documents the shifting emphasis in philosophy over 
time at Princeton, from Archibald Alexander, who stays with Witherspoon’s 
emphasis on Scottish common sense ideas, to Charles Hodge, who opposes 
Finney’s revivalism and free will, and criticizes Finney’s use of  reason and 
appeal to common sense notions of  freedom and responsibility. Hodge does 
not overtly reject Scottish common-sense principles, and continues to use 
what Mark Noll calls epistemological Common Sense.42  
Epistemological Common Sense is the view that “our perceptions reveal 
the world pretty much as it is and are not merely ‘ideas’ impressed upon 
our mind.” Hodge begins to reject, however, what Noll calls ethical common 
sense, “the assertion that just as humans know intuitively some basic realities 
38George Mardsen, The Evangelical Mind and the New School Presbyterian Experience 





42Mark A. Noll, “Common Sense Traditions and American Evangelical 
Thought”American Quarterly 37, no. 2. (Summer 1985): 220-221; the continued use 
of  epistemological Common Sense at Princeton into the early twentieth century is 
documented by Darryl G. Hart, “The Princeton Mind in the Modern World and the 
Common Sense of  J. Gresham Machen,” WTJ, 46 (1984), 1-25.
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of  the physical world, so they know by the nature of  their own being certain 
foundational principles of  morality.” 43 
Moving away from this view that morality can be known at all from the 
natural world, Hodge retreats to a use of  reason tied almost exclusively to 
Scripture to understand and know morality. He began to view with great 
skepticism the deliverances of  moral instinct and common sense that had 
been part of  ethical Common Sense teaching.  
This tendency towards a more limited, confining, and absolute source 
of  truth was enhanced by Hodge’s successors, his son, Archibald Hodge, and 
theologian Benjamin Warfield. It was Hodge and Warfield together who, in 
seeking for a firmer and more foundational source of  truth, developed the 
theory of  the verbal inerrancy view of  Scriptural inspiration that came to 
dominate fundamentalism in the early twentieth century.44
This reaction against the New Haven theology and New School 
Presbyterians pushed the “Old School” Princetonians away from the 
experiential evidentialism of  the Scottish common sense school, which 
appreciated multiple sources of  truth, and relied on a practical probability 
rather than an absolute certainty. It moved them toward a foundationalism 
more akin to the empiricists and positivists of  the rising scientism. The 
difference was, of  course, that the object of  study would not be the natural 
world, but Scripture, which would be susceptible to the methods and rigor 
of  science.
This story is well told by George Marsden in his classic work on 
Fundamentalism and American Culture. What is less well known is the story of  
the successors of  the New Haven and New School Presbyterian theologies, 
those that did not buy into the foundationalist, verbal inerrancy of  Scripture 
as the increasingly exclusive source of  moral teaching.
This middle group became increasingly overshadowed by the 
fundamentalist/liberal split of  the early twentieth century. Groups felt forced 
to choose up sides between the growing extremes, and many of  them were 
pushed onto the foundationalist extremes of  either empiricist/experiential 
liberalism or propositional/verbalist fundamentalism. My study of  Adventist 
history and theology convinces me that Adventists were one of  the groups 
that inherited and worked, at least initially, from this alternate, middle path.45 
The Adventist heritage on this matter can be seen in the three areas 
discussed above: reliability, multiple truth sources, and God’s Moral 
Government. Importantly, each of  these three topics were somewhat 
43Noll, “Common Sense Traditions,” 220-221.
44Mark Noll, ed., The Princeton Theology: 1812-1921 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 1983, 2001), 30-33, 165-166, 218-220; the split between the New School’s 
continuing embrace of  the ethical elements of  the Scottish philosophy and Old 
Princeton’s growing concern over its experiential, subjective elements have also 
been noted by Tim McConnel, “The Old Princeton Apologetics: Common Sense or 
Reformed?” JETS 46.4 (December 2003): 647-72, 649-650.
45George Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980, 2006).
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obscured for much of  the twentieth century as Adventism fell into an orbit 
very close to Old-Princeton-influenced fundamentalism. It then reacted 
against that in the 1970s, with portions of  the church heading for liberal, or 
at least neo-orthodox, positions.  
Let’s consider these areas in turn by looking at some examples from 
one of  Adventism’s primary founders, Ellen White. If  we take them in 
reverse order, we start with the Moral Government of  God theology. It is not 
surprising that Ellen White should be sympathetic to the Moral Government 
of  God view, given her Methodist, Arminian roots. What is unusual and 
quite interesting, though, is her strong connection with the New School 
Presbyterian advocates of  it.  
Arthur White, Ellen White’s son, wrote this of  Ellen White: “as the year 
1900 opened, Ellen White was dividing her time and strength between the 
evangelistic interest at Maitland [in Australia] and her literary work. With this 
in mind on January 1, 1900, she wrote to Edson calling for her library to be 
sent to Australia:”46 This is what she wrote:
I have sent for four or five large volumes of  Barnes’ notes on the Bible. I 
think they are in Battle Creek in my house now sold, somewhere with my 
books. I hope you will see that my property, if  I have any, is cared for and 
not scattered as common property everywhere. I may never visit America 
again, and my best books should come to me when it is convenient.47
Given that she viewed Barnes’ commentaries as among her “best books,” 
it is not surprising that they had some shared views. The views that Barnes 
expresses in his commentary on Romans with the concept of  the atonement 
being explained in terms of  God’s Moral Government is very similar to that 
found in Ellen White. It is not to say that Ellen White got it from Barnes. 
Indeed, it may have been that he was one of  her favorite commentators 
because his conceptions in this regard were very similar to hers. Here is one 
quote as an example:
In the gift of  his Son as a substitute and surety for fallen man, is an 
everlasting testimony to the world, to the heavenly universe, and to worlds 
unfallen, of  the sacred regard which God has for the honor of  his law and 
the eternal stability of  his own moral government. It was also an expression of  
his love and mercy for the fallen human race. In the plan of  redemption, 
this Saviour was to bring glory to God by making manifest his love for the 
world.48 
Ellen White’s comprehensive Great Controversy theme is an expansion 
and re-focusing of  the Moral Government of  God construct developed by 
Grotius, Taylor, Barnes and others. White re-focuses it to the point where it 
has two centers, the main one being God’s love, though she never loses sight 
of  his justice and morality. After Ellen White, one might call it God’s Moral 
Government of  Love.  
46Arthur L. White, Ellen G. White, Vol. 4: The Australian Years, 1891-1900 
(Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1983), 448. 
47Ellen G. White, Letter 189, 1900.
48Ellen G. White, The Youth’s Instructor, August 5, 1897, Paragraph 4.
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Modern oversight of  the governmental aspects of  God’s moral nature 
causes confusion in the Adventist church over issues like the nature of  
the atonement and the centrality of  theodicy to questions about creation, 
evolution, and suffering. A restoration of  the full picture of  God’s Moral 
Government would help us more effectively deal with these issues as a church.
Ellen White was also very conscious and clear on the second point of  
wholistic probabilism, and that is the wholistic nature of  reality. She was 
no dualist, and was constantly commenting on the connection between the 
natural and spiritual worlds, whether it was the laws of  nature in regards to 
physical and mental health, or the laws of  nature and morality. Far from being 
a Bible-only moralist, she advocated for the study of  the Protestant system 
of  moral philosophy.  
In this regard she wrote: 
The plans devised and carried out for the education of  the youth are none 
too broad. They should not have a one-sided education, but all their powers 
should receive equal attention. Moral philosophy, the study of  Scriptures, 
and physical training should be combined with the studies usually pursued 
in schools.49  
Many Adventists reading this statement quickly and carelessly will 
assume that White is referring to the moral philosophy found in the Bible. 
But the list of  items is obviously in the disjunctive, as physical training is 
certainly different from scriptural or moral study. Further, in the nineteenth 
century, the course on moral philosophy, as it had been in John Witherspoon’s 
time, was taught in most Protestant colleges “as the capstone course of  the 
senior year of  collegiate instruction,” often by the president. It was widely 
understood as being the study of  morals from sources of  knowledge outside 
the scriptures.50  
Despite this inspired injunction that “moral philosophy” should be one 
of  the three main things studied in Adventist schools, twentieth-century 
Adventism generally joined fundamentalism in rejecting any meaningful 
study of  moral philosophy in the twentieth century. This means that our 
biblical moral insights became marooned on an island that could only be 
reached by people that shared our commitment to Scripture. It also in good 
part disconnected the study of  the sciences and humanities from the moral 
philosophical web that previously connected them with the study of  divinities.
This is in part the reason for the wrestling match that takes place in 
Adventist colleges and universities between the theology departments and 
those of  the sciences, sociology, psychology, history, and other humanities. 
The common vocabulary of  moral reasoning and discourse has been 
49Ellen G. White, Christian Education (Battle Creek, MI: International Tract 
Society, 1894), 210.  
50Allen C. Guelzo, “‘The Science of  Duty’: Moral Philosophy and the 
Epistemology of  Science in Nineteenth Century America,” in David Livingstone, 
D. G. Hart, Mark Noll, eds., Evangelicals and Science in Historical Perspective (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 267-269, 271.
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largely lost, and the disciplines have settled onto their general philosophical 
underpinnings created by their secular professional and scholarly counterparts.
The third and final point, that of  not requiring an objective, rigid certainty, 
was seen in Adventism’s refusal to accept, at least ostensibly, the theory of  
biblical verbal inerrancy. Despite being a conservative denomination, with 
literal views of  creation, Adventism did not accept, in good part due to Ellen 
White’s warnings, the theory of  verbal dictation. I say ostensibly, because 
in their twentieth-century brush with fundamentalism, many Adventists 
accepted the practice of  operating and defending a kind of  verbal inerrancy, 
even while denying the theory.
This failure to continue with a wholistic, practical view of  certainty was 
the primary reason that views of  inspiration of  the Bible as well as that of  
Ellen White were rigid and unrealistic in mid-twentieth-century Adventism. It 
was this artificial view of  inspiration that in turn led into the disillusionment 
of  many in the 1970s when confronted with the truths of  the operation of  
inspiration. It was this that pushed a portion of  educated Adventists into 
liberal or at least neo-orthodox camps.
In many ways, we still live with the fallout of  that conflict in the seventies 
between these two extremes. This is compounded with the challenge of  
postmodernism, which seems to critique both extremes as being based on 
a non-biblical, philosophically untenable, foundationalism. And indeed, 
the extremes are so based. But this critique generally overlooks the other 
philosophical pathway to which Adventism is truly heir, the evidentiary, 
wholistic probabilism of  Reid, Witherspoon, Taylor, Barnes, and Ellen White.
This is not a call to return to Scottish common-sense realism. One cannot 
truly return to philosophies of  the past that were constructed to deal with the 
assumptions, problems, and cultures of  their own time. But there are aspects 
of  that past that can be imported into a neo-holistic realism. The points 
of  practical certainty, wholistic moral reasoning based on multiple sources 
subject to Scripture, and a concern for the moral government of  God, can 
help guide both our philosophical and theological thinking as we continue to 
deal with the challenges of  modernity and postmodernity. The pathway ahead 
is not the same as the one behind, but we can continue to be guided by its way 
markers—as a surveyor keeps one eye on his prior positioning stakes as he 
continues to move forward to his ultimate goal. 
